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In June 2010, U.S. Senators Susan Collins, Joseph Lieberman, and Tom Carper introduced the 
Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act. One of  its many aims is to protect critical 
infrastructures in the United States from cyber attack. In January 2011, Brandon Milhorn, staff  
director of  the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, defended the bill, 
saying that it would prevent a hacker from opening the floodgates of  the Hoover Dam. Peter Soeth, 
a spokesman for the US Bureau of  Reclamation, the agency which manages the Hoover Dam, 
objected to that example, arguing that “These types of  facilities are protected by multiple layers of  
security, including physical separation from the internet, that are in place because of  multiple 
security mandates and good business practices.”1 
This dispute over the Hoover Dam demonstrates the classic pattern of  debate over critical 
infrastructures and their vulnerability to cyber attacks. Most of  the process control systems designed 
to manage critical infrastructures, such as electric grids, oil pipelines, and water utilities, use 
specialized hardware and proprietary protocols. However, since the 1990s, the managers of  these 
infrastructures have been integrating their control systems with computer networks built from 
commercial off-the-shelf  operating systems, such as Windows and Unix.2 This has simplified the 
task of  managing facilities remotely, but it has also made process control systems vulnerable to 
attack over the internet. Alarmists point to these connections as vulnerabilities that pose almost epic 
threats; skeptics immediately dismiss such fears, claiming that the necessary measures to prevent a 
catastrophic cyber attack have already been implemented. History suggests the truth lies somewhere 
in between. 
As a relatively young field, national cyber security policy has been open to speculation about 
potential threats. However, in 2011, network operators have accumulated enough experience and 
data from real world attacks to draw a more realistic picture of  the threats facing critical 
infrastructures. This paper will examine the history of  cyber security incidents at nuclear facilities to 
assess the extent to which recorded vulnerabilities pose an “epic” threat. Specifically, it will examine 
three cyber incidents that occurred at U.S. nuclear facilities between 2003 and 2008. It will then turn 
to details of  the 2010 Stuxnet attack against the Iranian nuclear program to outline similarities with 
the three U.S. incidents. The lessons from these four incidents suggest that situational awareness and 
other security measures are too weak in their current state to guarantee that a catastrophic attack will 
never happen. However, it will also argue that launching a catastrophic attack is not simple and 
requires a sophisticated adversary. The article will then turn to gaps in nuclear regulation that policy 
makers should consider when formulating cyber security policies, not only for nuclear facilities, but 
for other critical infrastructures. 
 
                                                
1  David Kravets, “No, Hackers Can’t Open Hoover Dam Floodgates” Threat Level, (Wired blog), February 3, 2011. 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/hoover/ 
2 Martin Stoddard et al, Process Control System Security Metrics – State of  Practice, Institute for Information Infrastructure 
Protection, August 2005. 
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 Figure 1: Highly simplified representation of  a process control network 
 
Process control systems 
Historically, critical infrastructures have used two kinds of  control systems: supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems that quickly gather remote field data, and distributed control 
systems (DCS) that manage automated manufacturing processes. Over time, these systems began to 
share many of  the same technologies and features, making them less distinct from each other. 
However, given their separate histories, much of  their distinct terminology remains. Other terms, 
such as integrated control systems (ICS) or instrumentation and control (I&C) are also used, 
depending on the traditional practice of  the facilities using these systems. This paper will collectively 
refer to these technologies as process control systems (PCS). 3 
Process control systems come in any number of  complex architectures, but a general pattern holds 
for most facilities. The control network is the collection of  computer systems which directly monitor 
and control plant operations. At the top are the human-machine interfaces (HMI) that display data from 
plant equipment and allow technicians to adjust their operations. These are often Windows or Unix 
based computers. HMI communicate over a control bus with other computers that monitor and 
control operations using software that is less user-friendly. These computers communicate over a 
field bus with programmable logic controllers (PLC), hardware that directly adjusts the various motors, 
sensors, actuators, and other physical components at the heart of  a plant's operations.4 This is a 
highly simplified description of  a control network; structure and terminology will vary. 
Power plants also have office networks for business purposes. The office networks often collect data 
from control networks and have connections with a wider corporate network over the internet. 
                                                
3 Stoddard et al, PCS Security Metrics. 
4 K. Korash et al. Emerging Technologies in Instrumentation and Controls: An Update. (Oak Ridge: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, 2006), 25-28. 
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Connecting control networks with business offices and the larger corporate network makes it easier 
for managers to match plant operations with business goals and improve efficiency. However, it also 
opens a path that malicious hackers on the wider internet could follow to the plant’s process control 
systems. 
 
Vulnerability of  process control systems 
Operators of  process control systems used to believe they were invulnerable to cyber attack for two 
main reasons. The first reason is the assumption that PCS are isolated from the internet; the second 
is that PCS generally use proprietary protocols and specialized hardware not compatible with 
ordinary computers and common network protocols like Ethernet and TCP/IP. These assumptions 
have led some PCS operators to see the threat of  a cyber attack as alarmist. For example, a 2002 
article published in CIO Magazine outlines the numerous security precautions taken by the 
Massachusetts Water Resource Authority (MWRA) and concludes that a cyber attack against its PCS 
would have no effect: 
[M]ost public utilities rely on a highly customized Scada system. No two are the 
same, so hacking them requires specific knowledge -- in this case, knowledge of  the 
MWRA's design and access to that customized software. ... Scada is not networked, 
except in two places. 5 
He added: 
[PLCs] follow the lowest level, most basic instructions (such as turn on and turn off), 
and report them to Scada ... If  something is wrong, the PLC says, "Help me" in the 
form of  an alarm. The alarm sounds at the water site and at the Scada operations 
centers. The alarm also flashes on the computers, and it can't be shut off  until a 
formal acknowledgement of  the alarm is made and physically logged by a human 
being6. 
However, many operators have been moving towards open protocols and off-the-shelf  hardware to 
manage their process control systems, even connecting them to the internet—sometimes 
inadvertently.7 These trends have made PCS vulnerable to hackers, often with dangerous results. 
This fact had been demonstrated even before the MWRA article and has been repeatedly confirmed 
by penetration testers hired to assess cyber security at critical infrastructures. At the 2006 Black Hat 
Conference, presenters from IBM Internet Security Systems' X-Force team outlined a penetration 
test at an unnamed power plant. While meeting with plant management in a conference room, the 
testing team found a unprotected wireless access point, used it to access the plant's business 
network, and from there accessed the plant's control network using a ten-year old exploit. In X-
Force's experience, only knowledge of  common internet protocols was necessary to interfere with 
PCS systems, but any hacker who wanted to take the extra step to learn about PCS protocols could 
                                                
5 Scott Berinato. "Debunking the Threat to Water Utilities", CIO Magazine (March 15, 2002). 
 http://www.cio.com/article/30935/Debunking_the_Threat_to_Water_Utilities 
6 Ibid. 
7  A common cause of  an inadvertent connection is a “rogue access point”. Employees sometimes set up a wireless 
network in their office without telling systems administrators. If  the access point is not well protected, a hacker can 
use it to bypass the firewalls and intrusion detection systems that administrators have set up to protect office 
computers from the wider internet. 
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find technical specifications online.8 
Past PCS attacks have even caused physical damage to critical infrastructures. For example, in 2000 a 
former contractor hacked into the Maroochy Water District's PCS system in Queensland, Australia, 
and released 80,000 liters of  raw sewage into parks, rivers, and even the Hyatt Regency Hotel; the 
smell drove away local residents, river water turned black, and marine life died as a result.9 In March 
2007, Idaho National Laboratory conducted a test of  the so-called "Aurora vulnerability". This 
vulnerability would allow an attacker at a remote high voltage circuit breaker to physically destroy a 
generator by quickly opening and closing the breaker. Details of  this vulnerability have been 
designated "For Official Use Only" by the Department of  Homeland Security.10 
Cyber attacks against PCS, whether intentional or unintentional, are likely underreported. No 
regulation exists requiring power plants to report problems with or attacks against their control 
systems. In the case of  the Aurora vulnerability, ES-ISAC (Electric Sector Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center) and the Nuclear Energy Institute issued advisories that required no action.11 In 
April 2009, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) issued a letter stating that 
many power companies were choosing not to identify critical assets in order to avoid complying with 
cyber security standards, leaving them exposed to such vulnerabilities as Aurora.12 NERC explains 
this behavior as a misconception of  cyber threats; most operators do not see their own systems as 
critical to the Bulk Electric System, so they fail to realize that a cyber attack could affect multiple 
systems at once, and through them the power grid as a whole. In another case, an unnamed power 
plant suffered a targeted attack and lost process control systems for two weeks. However, since the 
attack did not disrupt power generation, the attack was not reported to government agencies.13 
 
Process control systems at nuclear power plants 
The United States has 104 nuclear power plants generating 98,000 megawatts of  electricity, roughly 
20% of  the electricity generated within the US. These plants generally have process control systems, 
often designed by the same companies that provide these systems to non-nuclear power plants.14 
However, the operators of  non-nuclear plants usually have better hardware and cyber security 
experience than their colleagues at nuclear facilities. Since installation and upgrades of  PCS are 
                                                
8 David Maynor and Robert Graham. "SCADA Security and Terrorism: We're not crying wolf", (paper presented at the 
Black Hat conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, July 29-August 3, 2006). 
 http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-federal-06/BH-Fed-06-Maynor-Graham-up.pdf 
9 Marshall Abrams and Joe Weiss. "Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study - Maroochy Water 
Services, Australia" National Institute of  Standards and Technology, Computer Security Resource Center (August 
2008). 
 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/ics/documents/Maroochy-Water-Services-Case-Study_report.pdf 
10 Joe Weiss. "One reason why we need regulation", ControlGlobal.com Unfettered Blog (December 18, 2008). 
 http://community.controlglobal.com/content/one-reason-why-we-need-regulation 
11 Ibid. 
12 Michael Assante. "Critical Cyber Asset Identification" (Letter to Industry Stakeholders from the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation, April 7, 2009). 
 http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/News/CIP-002-Identification-Letter-040709.pdf 
13 Joe Weiss. "Control system cyber events, 60 Minutes, disclosure, and FUD", ControlGlobal.com Unfettered Blog 
(November 13, 2009).  
 http://community.controlglobal.com/content/control-system-cyber-events-60-minutes-disclosure-and-fud 
14 Ken Barnes, Briam Johnson, and Reva Nickelson. Review of  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition  (SCADA) Systems, 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, January 2004, page 9. 
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costly and time-consuming, most non-nuclear PCS operate for eight to fifteen years, the expected 
lifespan of  the hardware used. However, nuclear plants face even higher costs and more stringent 
safety requirements for their PCS, so they often choose to continue using their original control 
systems rather than upgrade. A nuclear PCS can be in service for twenty to thirty years, well past the 
life expectancy of  the hardware. Many plants are still using systems based on analog electronics 
rather than digital.15 This is confirmed by the experience of  nuclear engineer Joe Weiss, now a 
managing partner of  Applied Control Solutions, a consultancy specializing in control system cyber 
security. Mr. Weiss worked for five years managing a nuclear instrumentation program for the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). However, nuclear plants prefer to use tested technologies 
so Mr. Weiss did not get to do "bleeding edge" research until he managed EPRI's research program 
for fossil fuel plant instrumentation. This meant that nuclear plants had often adopted modern 
information technology for their process control systems, but had less experience implementing 
cyber security on those systems than their colleagues at other electric power plants. This experience 
gap often led nuclear operators to assume they were less exposed to cyber threats than non-nuclear 
power plants.16 
In the past five years, US government-funded research into the cyber security of  process control 
systems has focused mainly on oil and gas utilities and the electric grid. While nuclear power plants 
face many of  the same issues in protecting their infrastructure, the key difference is the nuclear 
reactor. Non-nuclear generators can be completely shutdown, but nuclear reactors run for one to 
two years once the fuel is installed. Even when the reactor is "shutdown", the fuel still produces 
decay heat and must be cooled, or the reactor core may melt. The partial meltdown of  Three-Mile 
Island Unit 2 occurred during a reactor shutdown due to operator errors and equipment 
malfunctions.17 If  such errors and malfunctions can be replicated by a cyber attack, then a reactor 
meltdown is possible. To determine the danger of  this threat, it is necessary to examine cyber 
incidents that have occurred at nuclear power plants. 
 
Davis-Besse worm infection 
On January 25, 2003, at 12:30 AM Eastern Standard Time, the Slammer worm began exploiting a 
vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server. Within ten minutes, it had infected 75,000 servers 
worldwide—90% of  vulnerable hosts. The design of  Slammer was simple; it did not write itself  to 
the hard drive, delete files, or obtain system control for its author. Instead, it settled in system 
memory and searched for other hosts to infect. Removing the worm was as simple as rebooting the 
server after closing network port 1434, Slammer's point of  entry. Installing a patch Microsoft had 
released six months earlier would eliminate the vulnerability Slammer exploited and prevent another 
infection. 
Although Slammer carried no malicious payload, it still caused considerable disruption. It searched 
for new hosts by scanning random IP addresses. This generated a huge volume of  spurious traffic, 
consuming bandwidth and clogging networks. Slammer’s random IP scans disabled data-entry 
terminals at a 911 call center in Bellevue, Washington (population 680,000), shutdown 13,000 Bank 
of  America ATMs, and forced Continental Airlines to cancel several flights when their online 
                                                
15 Ibid, page 23. 
16 Joe Weiss. "Nuclear plant cyber security has a ways to go", ControlGlobal.com Unfettered Blog, March 25, 2008. 
 http://community.controlglobal.com/content/nuclear-plant-cyber-security-has-ways-go 
17 Ronald L. Krutz. Securing SCADA Systems. (Indianapolis: Wiley Publishing, 2006), 29. 
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ticketing system and kiosks could not process orders.18 South Korea suffered a nationwide internet 
outage lasting half  a day.19 
The Slammer worm also infected computer systems at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant near 
Oak Harbor, Ohio. The worm traveled from a consultant's network, to the corporate network of  
First Energy Nuclear, the licensee for Davis-Besse, then to the process control network for the 
plant. The traffic generated by the worm clogged the corporate and control networks. For four 
hours and fifty minutes, plant personnel could not access the Safety Parameter Display System 
(SPDS), which shows sensitive data about the reactor core collected from coolant systems, 
temperature sensors, and radiation detectors—these components would be the first to indicate 
meltdown conditions. Power plants are required to notify the NRC if  an SPDS outage lasts longer 
than eight hours. 
The reactor at Davis-Besse had been offline for nearly a year before its Slammer infection due to the 
discovery of  a hole in the reactor head.20 Although Slammer's scanning traffic did block sensors 
from providing digital readouts to control systems, it did not affect analog readouts on the 
equipment itself; plant technicians could still get reliable data from sensors by physically walking up 
to them and looking at them, though this process is slower than retrieving data over a network. 
Davis-Besse had a firewall protecting its corporate network from the wider internet, and its 
configuration would have prevented a Slammer infection. However, a consultant had created a 
connection behind the firewall to the consultancy's office network. This allowed Slammer to bypass 
the firewall and infect First Energy's corporate network. From there, it faced no obstacle on its way 
to the plant control network. In response, First Energy set up a firewall between the corporate 
network and the plant control network. 
The Davis-Besse incident highlighted the fact that most nuclear power plants, by retrofitting their 
SCADA systems for remote monitoring from their corporate network, had unknowingly connected 
their control networks to the internet. At the time, the NRC did not permit remote operation of  
plant functions.21 That policy would change by 2008. 
 
Browns Ferry shutdown 
The August 19, 2006, shutdown of  Unit 3 at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant near Athens, Alabama, 
demonstrates that not just computers, but even critical reactor components, could be disrupted and 
disabled by a cyber attack. Unit 3 was manually shutdown after the failure of  both reactor 
recirculation pumps and the condensate demineralizer controller.22 Without the recirculation pumps, 
the power plant could not cool the reactor, making a shutdown necessary to avoid melting the 
reactor core. 
                                                
18 Robert O. Harrow, Jr. "Internet Worm Unearths New Holes", SecurityFocus (January 29, 2003), 
 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/2186 
19 Stacy Cowley and Martyn Williams. "Slammer Worm Slaps Net Down, But Not Out" PCWorld (January 25, 2003), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/108988/slammer_worm_slaps_net_down_but_not_out.html 
20 Kevin Poulsen. "Slammer worm crashed Ohio nuke plant network", SecurityFocus (August 19, 2003), 
 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767 
21 Ibid. 
22 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Effects of  Ethernet-based, non-safety related controls on the safe and 
continued operation of  nuclear power stations" NRC Information Notice (April 17, 2007). 
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The condensate demineralizer is a kind of  programmable logic controller (PLC); the recirculation 
pumps depend on variable frequency drives (VFD) to modulate motor speed. Both kinds of  devices 
have embedded microprocessors that can communicate data over Ethernet, a popular standard for 
local access networks (LAN). However, both devices are prone to failure in high traffic 
environments. A device using Ethernet broadcasts data packets to every other device connected to 
the network. Receiving devices must examine each packet to determine which ones are addressed to 
them and to ignore those that are not. It appears the Browns Ferry control network produced more 
traffic than the PLC and VFD controllers could handle; it is also possible that the PLC 
malfunctioned and flooded the Ethernet with spurious traffic, disabling the VFD controllers; tests 
conducted after the incident were inconclusive.  
The failure of  these controllers was not the result of  a cyber attack. However, it demonstrates the 
effect that one component can have on an entire PCS network and every device on that network. 
Combined with the Davis-Besse worm infection, the Browns Ferry shutdown presents a possible 
attack scenario. If  a worm like Slammer had infected the control network of  an active plant and 
attempted to spread not only through UDP, but also through Ethernet, it could have disabled the 
recirculation pumps as well as the sensors that would alert plant personnel to the problem.  
 
Hatch automatic shutdown 
Due to the growing network connections between control systems and office computers, even 
seemingly simple actions can have unexpected results. On March 7, 2008, Unit 2 of  the Hatch 
nuclear power plant near Baxley, Georgia, automatically shutdown after an engineer applied a 
software update to a single computer on the plant's business network. The computer was used to 
collect diagnostic data from the process control network; the update was designed to synchronize 
data on both networks. When the engineer rebooted the computer, the synchronization program 
reset the data on the control network. The control systems interpreted the reset as a sudden drop in 
the reactor's water reservoirs and initiated an automatic shutdown.23 
This innocent mistake demonstrates how malicious hackers could make simple changes to a business 
network that end up affecting a nuclear reactor—even if  they have no intent to interfere with critical 
systems. This incident is probably the least critical of  those examined so far, since it activated safety 
systems rather than disrupting them. However, it also demonstrates that plant operators do not fully 
understand the dependencies between network devices. This would make it difficult to identify and 
protect all the vulnerabilities in a process control system. 
 
Stuxnet: a proof  of  concept 
The Stuxnet attack against the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates the impact that a sophisticated 
adversary with a detailed knowledge of  process control systems can have on critical infrastructures. 
Stuxnet is believed to have destroyed 984 centrifuges at Iran’s uranium enrichment facility in 
Natanz.24 An analysis of  the event by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 
                                                
23 Brain Krebs, "Cyber Incident Blamed for Nuclear Power Plant Shutdown" Washington Post, June 5, 2008. 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/05/AR2008060501958.html 
24  William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iranian Nuclear 
Delay”. New York Times, January 15, 2011. 
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based on open source technical data about the Stuxnet computer worm and the Iranian nuclear 
program, found that Stuxnet may have been designed specifically for that purpose. However, 
Stuxnet also demonstrates the limitations that even such a sophisticated adversary would face in 
launching an attack against process control systems. The ISIS report finds that the Stuxnet attack, 
though it successfully disrupted the Iranian centrifuge program, did not slow down Iran’s 
accumulation of  low-enriched uranium.25 The attack is remarkable for its sophistication, but it did 
not pose an epic threat to Iran. 
However, that sophistication must be considered when assessing the vulnerability of  nuclear 
facilities to cyber attack. The Stuxnet worm targeted specific PCS components used in the Iranian 
centrifuge cascades: a frequency converter manufactured by Iranian firm Fararo Paya, another 
frequency converter manufactured by Finland’s Vacon,26 and the S7-315 and S7-417 programmable 
logic controllers made by Siemens.27 The PLCs controlled the frequency converters to modulate the 
speed at which the centrifuges spun. Stuxnet commanded the PLCs to speed up and slow down the 
spinning centrifuges, destroying some of  them, while sending false data to plant operators to make it 
appear the centrifuges were behaving normally. The New York Times report suggests that Stuxnet’s 
authors may have learned about vulnerabilities in the Siemens controllers thanks to a partnership 
between Siemens and the Idaho National Laboratory aimed at assessing vulnerabilities in such 
components. These products are general PCS components not unique to the Iranian nuclear 
program; Siemens reports that at least 24 of  its customers were infected by Stuxnet, though they 
suffered no damage.28 
The reason Stuxnet did not disrupt every vulnerable PCS it infected is that it was programmed to 
disrupt only systems that had the same configuration as the centrifuge cascade used at Natanz.29 
Antivirus company Symantec began detecting Stuxnet traffic in June 2009, mostly in Iran, but also in 
neighboring countries. However, since it did not spread aggressively and did not damage the systems 
it had infected, it raised little alarm.30 Only at the Natanz enrichment facility did it have a major 
effect. Experts cited by the New York Times report suggest that Israeli intelligence provided the 
specific technical details necessary for Stuxnet to limit its damage to the Iranian nuclear program. 
While the New York Times article only presents a possible scenario, that scenario and the evidence 
reflect the challenges of  executing a catastrophic cyber attack against a nuclear facility. Programming 
is a cyclical process of  trial and error. For an amateur hacker working only with a computer, the 
costs of  testing software are trivial. Testing software designed for process control systems, however, 
requires access to the system in question, which is usually expensive. Malicious hackers could run 
tests on a remote PCS they had compromised, but an unsuccessful test could raise alarms or damage 
the system before the hackers were ready for the next stage of  an attack. The Stuxnet authors would 
need a dedicated testbed to refine their code. Stuxnet also incorporated technical information 
specific to the Iranian facility. These resources are out of  the reach of  amateurs and would require 
                                                
25 David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond. “Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of  ISIS December 22, 
2010 Report”. ISIS Report, February 15, 2011, pg 2. 
26  David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond. “Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz 
Enrichment Plant? Preliminary Assessment”. ISIS Report, December 22, 2010, pg 3. 
27  Albright, Brannan, and Walrond. “Stuxnet Malware”, pg 1. 
28  “SIMTAC WinCC / SIMTAC PCS-7: Information about Malware / Viruses / Trojan horses”. Siemens, accessed 
April 14, 2011. 
http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/llisapi.dll?query=stuxnet&func=cslib.cssearch&content=adsearch%2
Fadsearch.aspx&lang=en&siteid=cseus&objaction=cssearch&searchinprim=0&nodeid0=10805583 
29  Albirght, Brannan, and Walrond. “Stuxnet Mlaware”, pg 1. 
30  Broad, Markoff, and Sanger. “Israeli Test”. 
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the kind of  funding and actionable intelligence that comes from state sponsorship. 
The Stuxnet attack also incorporates elements of  the other three incidents examined in this paper. 
First, it disrupted the systems that monitored physical components, like the Davis-Besse worm 
infection. Second, it interfered with programmable logic controllers, like the Browns Ferry data 
storm. Third, it relied on there being some path from ordinary office computer to process control 
systems, as in the Hatch automatic shutdown. At the same time, the Stuxnet authors innovated on 
these features: Stuxnet did not simply disrupt sensor output, it faked it; it did not simply interfere 
with PLCs, it gave them specific instructions; finally, it did not rely on an internet connection to 
Natanz—it also traveled between computers on worker’s thumb drives31 and infected components 
destined for Natanz at their source in the Iranian chain of  supply.32 
Skeptics and alarmists can both use the Stuxnet attack to justify their positions. Alarmists can point 
to the vulnerability of  PCS and its direct effect on Iranian national interests. However, skeptics can 
argue that the Stuxnet attack required specific knowledge of  a particular facility and cannot be 
generalized to other systems, the same argument used by the Massachusetts Water Resource 
Authority. Further, the impact could hardly be described as catastrophic. However, it is important to 
look at the Stuxnet attack in the context of  history. Cyber attacks have evolved from the work of  
amateurs and professional criminals into a serious endeavor for states engaged in international 
disputes. States have begun to use cyber attacks not just to gather intelligence or control information 
networks, but to damage physical infrastructures. While the damage is nowhere near a “digital Pearl 
Harbor”, the trend is clear: states are actively pursuing cyber attacks as an instrument of  foreign 
policy while advancing the technical know-how such attacks require. 
 
Lessons 
These four incidents hold important lessons for the cyber security of  nuclear facilities and critical 
infrastructures in general. First, skeptics claim that PCS are immune from attack since they are not 
connected to the internet. However, the Davis-Besse incident shows that this is a misconception; 
even operators who try to monitor and protect every connection cannot be sure they know about all 
of  them. Stuxnet even traveled on portable thumb drives to infect computers that were not 
connected to the internet. Second, skeptics argue that PCS are immune from attack since they are 
different from ordinary computers. However, all four incidents demonstrate that PCS have become 
interoperable with ordinary computers, making them vulnerable. Third, vulnerabilities are more 
complicated than both skeptics and alarmists realize. Alarmists often invoke the danger of  hackers 
taking control of  a power plant, but these incidents show how unintelligent computer viruses and 
even malfunctions in small devices can have big unexpected effects. This suggests that even though 
nuclear facilities are vulnerable to attack, a malicious hacker would have difficulty making sure an 
attack works precisely as planned. Even so, states are working make cyber attacks more precise, 
supplementing their methods with intelligence from other sources. 
 
Cyber security and nuclear safety regulations 
As states take a greater interest in launching cyber attacks against nuclear facilities, they should also 
                                                
31 Albright, Brannan, and Walrond. “Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges?” pg 7. 
32 Albright, Brannan, and Walrond. “Stuxnet Malware”, pg 2. 
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take a greater interest in protecting their own facilities against attack. This means translating the 
lessons of  previous incidents into workable guidance and regulation for plant operators. So far, this 
has been lacking, both from the United States government and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). The nuclear industry does not have the expertise to handle such threats on its own, 
as evidenced not only by the incidents covered here, but also by the lack of  compliance with NERC 
critical asset identification standards.33 
However, the agencies charged with providing the necessary guidance may not have that expertise 
themselves. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) did not issue an Information Notice 
after the Hatch shutdown as it had for the Davis-Besse and Browns Ferry incidents. The NRC is 
aware of  its expertise gap and is actively addressing it. In January 2008, the NRC's newly established 
Computer Security Office launched a working group to develop an Information Security Strategic 
Plan (ISSP) for 2010 to 2015. The working group found that cyber security issues at nuclear plants 
were handled in an "ad hoc" manner, since the NRC's staff  with cyber experience were both limited 
and widely dispersed about the country. The NRC set up an Information Security Steering 
Committee to coordinate the activities of  these dispersed experts under the ISSP, including the 
development of  new rules and regulatory guidance for cyber security at nuclear facilities. Part of  that 
process will be implementing a 2008 recommendation from the Office of  the Inspector General to 
develop a program of  cyber security inspections at nuclear power plants.34 The ISSP outlines plans 
to use the NRC’s licensing and inspection authority to enforce cyber security standards at nuclear 
facilities,35 however, it is too early to judge the effectiveness of  these efforts. 
While the IAEA lacks the enforcement powers of  the NRC, it still has an important role to play as 
inspector and advisor to the nuclear programs of  other nations. However, it seems to be a bit slower 
than the NRC in developing its cyber security expertise. Its most recent technical guidance on the 
matter seems to be “Security of  Information and Instrumentation & Control Systems at Nuclear 
Facilities” released in 2007. However, this guidance fails to account for documented PCS incidents 
in both nuclear and non-nuclear facilities and the reported experience of  penetration testers. For 
example, the guidance states that cyber security at nuclear facilities can be achieved using the same 
methods and tools developed for IT security.36 However, the Browns Ferry data storm was created 
by either a failed PCS component or normal network operations; IT security would not have 
predicted the resulting failure of  the reactor pump VFDs. Since then, Stuxnet has further 
demonstrated the inadequacy of  basic IT security, since it infected PCS components in the Iranian 
supply chain rather than looking for a direct network connection to Natanz. The guidance also 
recommends developing a network diagram documenting all external connections, however, the 
assumption that all external connections were known and controlled was the basis for the supposed 
invulnerability of  PCS. Even in the IT world, penetration testers have found that network diagrams 
are often grossly inaccurate and only create a false sense of  security. While the IAEA guidance does 
give some sound advice for basic cyber security, it does not begin to address the unique challenges 
presented by PCS. The IAEA is continuing to develop its expertise in this area, especially since the 
Stuxnet attack, however, the current state of  official guidance and regulation suggests that those 
responsible for protecting nuclear facilities from cyber attack are less prepared than their potential 
                                                
33  Assante. “Critical Cyber Asset Identification”. 
34 Stephen D. Dingbaum. "NRC's Planned Cyber security Program (OIG-08-A-06)". Memorandum Report from the 
Office of  the Inspector General (March 18, 2008). 
35  Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Information Security Strategic Plan”. May 18, 2009. 
 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2009/secy2009-0077/enclosure.pdf 
36 International Atomic Energy Agency. "Security of  Information and Instrumentation & Control Systems at Nuclear 
Facilities", IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. XX Technical Guidance. 2007, page 13. 
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aggressors. 
 
Conclusion: A mixed bag 
While some cyber security incidents have occurred at nuclear power plants, crossing the imaginary 
boundary between IT and PCS and shutting down reactors, so far the potential for damaging a 
nuclear reactor appears theoretical. Scott Lunsford, a penetration tester for IBM, says government 
mandated safeguards would prevent a hacker from triggering a meltdown. So far, no catastrophic 
damage has resulted from a cyber attack against a nuclear facility. The same cannot be said for other 
sectors, as in the case of  the Maroochy water incident, and the Stuxnet attack has demonstrated that 
states are likely pushing the development of  new tactics and capabilities in cyberspace. 
Although the experience of  the nuclear sector lags behind that of  non-nuclear facilities in cyber 
security and PCS, nuclear plants must also comply with stronger safety regulations and inspections. 
Although he NRC's cyber regulations are still being developed, its existing regulations have put 
several incidents on the public record that would have gone unreported by non-nuclear power 
plants. This parallels the trend of  cyber security in e-commerce. In the early 2000's, banks and online 
merchants commonly suffered cyber attacks that potentially revealed their customers private data to 
hackers. To protect their reputations, they hired consultants to quietly fix their systems under a non-
disclosure agreement. Eventually, California passed SB1386, requiring any company that did 
business in the state of  California to notify their customers if  a hacker could have potentially 
accessed their private data. After the law went into effect in July 2003, the extent of  the hacking 
became public knowledge and companies began to invest in cyber security to reassure their 
customers before they suffered an attack. Oil, gas, and electric companies have been active in 
protecting their PCS from cyber attack, however, they still have little incentive to report the attacks 
they suffer. No regulation requires it, and companies fear their information could be made public 
under the Freedom of  Information Act if  they do. The years from 2010 to 2015 could prove 
decisive in the field of  PCS security. If  the NRC can implement the same sort of  rigorous 
inspection and reporting requirements for cyber security as they have for physical security and safety, 
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